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ing the British Industrial Revolution was relatively slow. The Crafts–Harley view of the
Industrial Revolution is thus reinforced. Our preferred estimates suggest a modest acceleration
after 1800.
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How rapid was productivity growth during the Industrial Revolution? Since the
pioneering studies of Ashton (1948) as well as Deane and Cole (1962), this question
has been central to the economic history of Britain, 1750–1850. It is also of wider in-
terest for the speed and timing of productivity changes following major inventions.
After the introduction of electric motors and the computer, for example, productivity
performance remained sluggish for decades. When it did pick up, total factor produc-
tivity (TFP) increases were rapid and widespread. Of course, technological change
need not be mirrored in TFP growth. As the recent work of the Boskin commission
and of Nordhaus demonstrates, traditional measures such as price indices may miss
substantial product innovation altogether.
1 Yet it is important to examine how TFP
changes during and after major inventions. Recent examples of slow productivity
growth and rapid technical progress may not be aberrations, but could form part
of a regular pattern if we can also demonstrate convincingly that England did not be-
come much more eﬃcient during the ﬁrst few decades of the Industrial Revolution.
2
Crafts and Harley have estimated modest rates of output growth during the In-
dustrial Revolution.
3 Crafts found that Deane and Cole (1962) had chosen an inap-
propriate price index with which to deﬂate the nominal income series in the national
accounts, thus overstating growth. He also compiled alternative indices for agricul-
tural, industrial and service output. His ﬁnding of substantially slower growth was
reinforced by Harley, who argued that the earlier estimates of industrial production
by Hoﬀmann (1955) had seriously overestimated growth (by giving too high a weight
to the revolutionary cotton sector). Since rates of input growth have not been sim-
ilarly revised downwards, their results also imply that the Solow residual was only
growing relatively slowly during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century.
4
Deane and Cole did not provide any estimates of total factor productivity growth
during the industrial revolution. Later work by Feinstein (1981), however, showed
that Deane and Coles estimates implied remarkably rapid total factor productivity
growth, especially for the period 1801–1831.
5 Using the standard, primal approach
to growth accounting, Feinstein estimated annual productivity growth of 0.2% for
the period 1760–1800 and of 1.3% for the period 1801–1830. The latest calculations
by Crafts and Harley, based on their revised output series, imply increases of only
0.1% p.a. during 1760–1800 and 0.35% p.a. during 1800–1830 (Table 1). The new or-
thodoxy thus holds that both output and productivity growth were slow during the
English Industrial Revolution. Also, advances were heavily concentrated in the re-
volutionizing sectors such as cotton and iron manufacturing. These sectors were
too small to have a sizeable impact on the manufacturing sector as a whole (and the
1 Boskin et al. (1998) and Nordhaus (1997).
2 David (1990).
3 Crafts (1985), Harley (1982), and Crafts and Harley (1992).
4 Voth (1998) revises labour input ﬁgures based on a sharp rise in working hours.
5 Feinsteins revisions of Deane and Coles estimates concentrated on the ﬁgures on capital formation.
See Feinstein and Pollard (1988) for more on this issue.
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the Industrial Revolution was neither the speed of output growth nor its cause, but a
broad structural transformation, reallocating labour from agriculture to industry.
The new orthodoxy established by Crafts and Harley has attracted criticism from
diﬀerent perspectives.
6 All contributors to the literature on the speed of output and
productivity growth emphasize the fragility of the underlying data. As Feinstein said
ofhisestimates ofcapitalformation—‘‘weareabletoproceedonlybyrelianceoncon-
jecture and speculation.’’
7 Some critics of the dominant view argue that data revisions
and changes in procedure should substantially modify it; others doubt the value of the
exercise as such, given the limitations of the data and the number of non-quantitative
aspects necessarily excluded. Berg and Hudson ﬁrmly fall into the second category.
They emphasize demographic change, regional specialization, organizational changes
andtheevolutionoffemaleandchildlabourasareas thatshowedtruly revolutionary
change. They also voice a general distrust of aggregate, quantity-based output and
TFP calculations, and point to some potential sources of fragility of the estimates de-
rived—suchastheassumptionofconstantreturnstoscale.
8Theirpleafortheinclusion
of non-quantitative evidence, and their sceptical evaluation of Craftss and Harleys
data work is in part a continuation of Julian Hoppits critique. He emphasized the dif-
ﬁculties of applying appropriate weights to the output series of individual industries.
This is normally based on value-added, evidence on which is relatively fragile.
9
Other critics have attempted to rework the original data, or to add new evidence.
R.V. Jackson argues for higher weights for faster-growing industries.
10 Based on a
reexamination of the Crafts–Harley data set, he challenges the view that industrial
Table 1
Previous estimates of productivity growth in England, 1760–1831
Annual percentage rate of change Y K L T TFP
Feinstein (1981)
1760–1800 1.1 1 0.8 — 0.2
1801–1831 2.7 1.4 1.4 — 1.3
1831–1860 2.5 2.0 1.4 0.8
Crafts (1985)
1760–1800 1 1 0.8 0.2 0.2
1801–1831 2 1.5 1.4 0.4 0.7
1831–1860 2.5 2.0 1.4 0.6 1.0
Crafts and Harley (1992)
1760–1801 1 1 0.8 — 0.1
1801–1831 1.9 1.7 1.4 — 0.35
1831–1860 2.5 2 1.4 0.8
Note. Based on the ﬁgures in Harley (1999b, p. 183) adapted to the two-factor-case.
6 The most comprehensive overview of the debate is Mokyr (1999).
7 Feinstein (1981).
8 Berg and Hudson (1992).
9 Hoppit (1990).
10 Jackson (1990) also argues that there is a mistake in Craftss original calculation of the output in
commerce, which Crafts and Harley (1992) accept.
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11
His series of industrial output suggests a break in the trend rate of growth as early as
the 1780s. Overall, however, his index is not too diﬀerent from the one proposed by
Crafts and Harley, and they have accepted his estimates as a possible alternative in-
terpretation of the data.
12 Cuenca Esteban (1994, 1995) has attempted to use addi-
tional information on the price of cotton goods derived from contemporary customs
estimates to argue that Crafts and Harley have understated the growth of cotton out-
put. Overall output growth for England would be markedly higher if his corrected
ﬁgures for textile production are used. Crafts and Harley have defended their esti-
mates.
13 Cuenca Estebans alternative index is not generally accepted as a superior
measure of changing cotton prices.
14
Finally, Temin has used a novel approach to lend credence to the idea that pro-
ductivity advances were relatively wide-spread. He analysed the pattern of British
trade during the period to examine revealed comparative advantage. While not cal-
culating TFP directly, Temin argues that slow (and heavily concentrated) productiv-
ity growth should have turned England into a net importer of most manufactured
goods.
15 Since Britain continued to export most industrial goods, he rejects the no-
tion of limited and minimal productivity advances. Crafts and Harley (2000) use a
CGE-model to show that the trade data can be reconciled with concentrated (and
slow) productivity growth, generating some puzzling implications in the process.
16
The marked improvements in quantity-based national accounts over the past 20
years—especially in the case of capital inputs and overall output measure-
ment—have therefore not led to an unquestioned consensus. Independent of the
merits of individual challenges, continuing debate over the core elements of the
Crafts–Harley view shows that what is needed are new results based on additional
data, using a diﬀerent technique to extract information from the same set of under-
lying methodological assumptions. In this paper, we use a dual approach to derive
independent estimates of TFP growth during the English Industrial Revolution.
Based on factor prices, we show that there is clear evidence of slow productivity
growth. Using an unrelated method and independent data, the main aspects of the
new orthodoxy still emerge, thus adding to our conﬁdence in the Crafts–Harley view.
Section 2 brieﬂy introduces the dual approach to TFP accounting, and argues that in
the case of historical data, it will yield estimates that are at least as reliable as those
derived from the primal approach. We then discuss the data sources used in our cal-
culations. Section 3 presents our new estimates of TFP growth, and confronts these
with existing calculations. In Section 4, we conduct a number of sensitivity tests. We
conclude with some observations on the wider implications of our ﬁndings.
11 Jackson (1992). Crafts and Harley (1992) contend that, contrary to Jacksons argument, any revision
would have to be downwards.
12 Crafts and Harley (1992).
13 Harley and Crafts (1995) and Harley (1999a).
14 Honeyman (1996).
15 Temin (1997, 2000).
16 Temin (2000).
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Using input and output prices (instead of quantities) to measure changes in pro-
ductivity is not a novel idea. Griliches and Jorgenson demonstrated the equivalence
of the primal and dual approaches to growth accounting.
17 An early application of
the dual approach to economic history can be found in McCloskey, who inferred
changes in agricultural productivity during the Industrial Revolution from move-
ments in rents paid for land.
18 Recently, Clark has extended McCloskeys technique
by also considering changes in farm wages and return on farm capital, deriving over-
all measures of productivity change in agriculture.
19
The dual approach has also been used to measure productivity in manufacturing
during the Industrial Revolution. McCloskey analysed output and input price data
in several industrial sectors to infer annual productivity change between 1780 and
1860. He summarized the intuition behind the dual approach thus: ‘‘We do not know
annual quantities of china plates and steam coal,...and probably never can. On the
other hand, we know practically anything we choose about price. ...The technique
is to measure physical productivity change by the changes in prices ...The degree to
which the price of the cloth fell relative to the price of the inputs is therefore a mea-
sure of productivity change.’’
20 Productivity advances will eventually bid up the price
of factors of production, as they must in a competitive economy. The extent to which
capital, labour and land can receive higher payments is a direct measure of the pace
of productivity advances.
The same argument can be made for the economy as a whole. If the remuneration
of all factors of production increases, overall output must be growing. A similar in-
tuition lies behind the use of value-added in constructing national accounts. We will
assume that there are only three factors of production in the economy: labor (L),
capital (K) and land (T). Thus, at any given date t, output (Y) will be a function
of K, L and T at date t:
Yt ¼ FðKt;Lt;TtÞ: ð1Þ
Following Hsieh (1999), our derivation of the dual estimates of productivity growth
is based on the national income accounting identity that the (real) value of national
output has to be equal to the (real) payments to the factors, i.e.:
Yt ¼ rtKt þ wtLt þ qtTt; ð2Þ
where w, r and q are real wages, the real rental rate of capital and real agricultural
rents respectively.
21 Taking logarithms and diﬀerentiating with respect to time we
obtain the following expression:
17 Griliches and Jorgenson (1967).
18 McCloskey (1972, pp. 32–33).
19 Clark (1999).
20 McCloskey (1994, pp. 250–251).
21 Notice that no assumption is needed (other than that labor, capital and land are the only three
factors of production) to obtain Eq. (2).
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where hats indicate growth rates and g is the share of income going to each factor.
22
Rearranging we obtain:
^ Y Y   gK ^ K K   gL^ L L   gT ^ T T ¼ gK^ r r þ gL^ w w þ gT^ q q: ð4Þ
Note that the left-hand side of Eq. (4) is just the usual (primal) expression for the
Solow residual, that is, the diﬀerence between the growth rate of output and a
weighted-sum of the growth rates of factor inputs, with the weights being the shares
of each input in total income. The right-hand side of Eq. (4), our dual measure of
total factor productivity growth, is equal to the weighted-sum of the growth rates of
real factor prices.
23 Summarizing, we have obtained TFPPrimal ¼ TFPDual ¼
gK^ r r þ gL^ w w þ gT^ q q which will be the expression we use throughout this paper to obtain
our measures of productivity growth in England between 1770 and 1860. Although it
should be clear from the above derivation, we should stress the fact that the equality
between the primal and dual approaches to growth accounting simply follows from
an identity.
This however does not imply that our measure of productivity is ﬂawless. In fact,
in order for the right-hand side of Eq. (4) to truthfully measure total factor produc-
tivity we further need to assume perfect competition and constant returns to scale. In
the presence of imperfect competition, technological progress that is not Hicks-neu-
tral, or increasing returns to scale, factors of production would not be paid the value
of their marginal product and dual estimates of total factor productivity could be
shown to be biased.
24 However, and this is a crucial point, if the above assumptions
are violated, primal measures of productivity will be biased by the same amount
since, as discussed above, primal and dual estimates are theoretically equivalent.
25
Hence, any diﬀerence between the primal and dual approaches has to stem from
an inconsistency between the national accounts and the data on factor prices. One
potential shortcoming—that, again, would aﬀect primal and dual estimates—should
be mentioned at the outset. If we assume an alternative production function, with an
additional factor such entrepreneurship or productive knowledge, our estimates
might be biased downwards. This is because we would fail to measure the additional
return received by this factor.
26 Given the diﬃculty of measuring returns to such fac-
tors of production, this may be impossible to remedy. There is some indirect evidence
that such a development might have been at work during the Industrial Revolution.
Feinstein (1998b) shows that GDP grew faster over the period than real wages,
which suggests that other factors of production received a growing slice of the pie.
22 We use log diﬀerences to compute growth rates.
23 If we had used nominal values, this would be equal to the diﬀerence between the weighted-sum of
growth rates and the growth rate of output prices.
24 Hsieh (2000, 2002).
25 In the primal approach, the bias would come from the fact that, if factors are not paid their marginal
product, factor shares are no longer equal to the elasticity of output with respect to each factor. Cf. Crafts
and Harley (1992) in response to this kind of criticism by Berg and Hudson (1992).
26 Hsieh (2002).
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greater increases than real wages, the limitations of using a production function with
three factors may partly be responsible.
Note that, in some ways, using the dual approach reduces the impact of entrepre-
neurial quasi-rents in transitions between diﬀerent equilibria. These are generally dif-
ﬁcult to capture using national income accounting, but dual measurement at the level
of the economy at large minimizes their inﬂuence. In the case of cotton, for example,
one could argue about the extent to which a gradual erosion of the high rents cap-
tured by the ﬁrst generation of producers was responsible to the output price decline
relative to inputs. If cotton producers earned higher than average returns on their
capital, we would be in danger of overestimating the rate of productivity change.
27
For the economy as a whole, of course, the inﬂuence of sector-speciﬁc rents or inno-
vation premia will be much smaller—and estimating the rental price of capital is cor-
respondingly less problematic. Note also the direction of bias. Since the cotton
industry by the middle of the 19th century was a highly competitive industry, with
hundreds of small- and medium-sized producers, any rents that might initially have
existed had probably largely disappeared by 1850. Any decline in price would there-
fore be the result of higher productivity and a reduction in monopoly power. The
larger innovation premia were in the beginning, and the faster they declined, the
greater the upward bias of our estimates of TFP growth will be.
Previous studies have mostly analysed particular sectors of the economy (e.g. ag-
riculture, cotton), using input and output price data from these particular sectors to
infer productivity changes. The diﬀerence between this previous dual literature and
this paper is one of scope. Our approach focuses on the economy as a whole. Recent
contributions by Feinstein, Turner, Beckett and Afton and Clark have provided ag-
gregate national series for wages and rents in England during the Industrial Revolu-
tion.
28 We take advantage of these contributions to construct a dual estimate of
aggregate total factor productivity growth in England in the period 1770–1860.
The exercise that is most closely related to ours is Clark (2001b), who also uses factor
prices to calculate TFP growth in England.
29 The next section describes the data in
more detail, and presents the most important results.
3. Data and results
Our approach requires data on the evolution of prices, the rental cost of capital,
the cost of labour, and the return to land. Choosing a series for wages is easier than
for any other component that we require. Feinsteins (1998a,b) series is the deﬁnitive
contribution to the literature, replacing the earlier indices compiled by Lindert and
27 Assuming that measures of the return on capital for the economy as a whole are used in calculating
sectoral productivity growth.
28 Feinstein (1998a), Turner et al. (1997), and Clark (1998, 2002).
29 Clarks main aim, however, is not to use factor prices as independent evidence on TFP growth rates.
Instead, he oﬀers a broad interpretation of the long-term development of the British economy.
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30 Feinsteins estimates of average nominal earnings in Great Brit-
ain relate to manual (blue-collar) workers and exclude salaried (white-collar) work-
ers. Lindert and Williamson (1983) restricted their study to England, but also
considered white-collar workers. Although these two studies sustain opposite views
on the living standards issue, Lindert and Williamsons nominal wage series for blue-
collar workers is remarkably similar to the Feinstein data. Most of the diﬀerence be-
tween these authors views arises as a result of the use of diﬀerent price indices. Since
all the price indices for our period are highly imperfect, we also use the Lindert and
Williamson index in our sensitivity tests.
31 Feinsteins new index is considerably
more comprehensive, covering 24 diﬀerent occupations or industries that employed
4 out of 5 Britons in 1851. His inclusion of Scotland may bias our results in favor of
ﬁnding faster productivity growth, since growth there was probably more rapid than
in England.
It could be argued that a rising proportion of unskilled workers in the workforce
exerted downward pressure on wages as measured by real wage indices.
32 Feinsteins
series implicitly assumes that all changes in skill are incorporated in the level of av-
erage earnings.
33 Controlling for the possible eﬀects of changes in the skill composi-
tion of the workforce would clearly be desirable. Other studies eliminate the eﬀect of
changes in the skill composition by using separate wage series for each skill category.
We decided not to correct wage changes for human capital formation. This is be-
cause the size and trend of skill premia during the Industrial Revolution are highly
uncertain, and there is little evidence that the skills of the workforce changed rap-
idly.
34 Also, changes in the number of hours worked per day should be taken into
account in our productivity calculations. However, since most of the changes in total
hours of labor input during this period were caused by more days of work (and not
changes in hours per day), this is unlikely to be a source of confusion.
35
We use two diﬀerent price indices, the consumer price index compiled by Feinstein
as well as Clarks GDP deﬂator. Feinsteins represents an important improvement
over earlier series. The range of commodities covered is wider than in earlier studies
(incorporating items such as milk, beer, potatoes, and cheese), contains new informa-
tion on the price of cotton cloth, and includes a national measure of rent. The new
series implies markedly slower growth of real wages largely because prices fell less
between 1801 and 1850 than Lindert and Williamson had assumed.
36 For the pur-
poses of productivity measurement, we would ideally want to use the GDP deﬂator,
i.e. include the price of exports and exclude the price of imports. One such series has
30 We use the average full employment money earnings for Great Britain, Feinstein (1998a, Appendix
Table 1, p. 652).
31 In this way, the use of the Lindert–Williamson series provides us with an upper bound. Cf. Clark
(2001b).
32 We thank Daron Acemoglu for this suggestion.
33 Feinstein (1996).
34 Schoﬁeld (1973) found that illiteracy fell slightly between 1754 and 1844; cf. Mitch (1993).
35 Voth (2001).
36 Lindert and Williamson (1983).
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plicitly for the bias arising from traded goods, using the Feinstein index as a basis for
our estimate.
The series for land rental values is potentially more problematic. In contrast to
recent studies of East Asia, we need to include land as a factor of production—the
share of rents in total income was approximately 15%.
37 As for data on land rents,
there are the alternative series by Turner et al. (1997) and by Clark.
38 Since changes
over time are broadly similar, the choice of index is not decisive. We will use the
latter in our benchmark estimates and the former in our sensitivity tests.
A more diﬃcult question is whether rents are a good indicator of the return to
land. For our dual estimates of productivity growth to be accurate, factors need to
be paid the value of their marginal product. Allen argues that since rents ‘‘were not
adjusted annually and so could fall behind changes in land values, [...] price calcu-
lations can give spurious measures of productivity change.’’
39 Even if rents were ad-
justed slowly, as long as a more or less constant proportion of rents were changed
each year, any increase in the value of land would lead, in the long run, to a pro-
portional increase in rents.
40 Since in this paper we compute productivity growth
over thirty-year periods, it is most likely that the growth rate of rents is not af-
fected.
We estimate the rental cost of capital based on the standard Hall–Jorgenson for-
mula.
41 For this, we require information for three separate components—real inter-







ði   p þ dÞ; ð5Þ
where Pk=P is the relative price of capital, i is the interest rate, p is inﬂation, and d is
the depreciation rate. We use Feinsteins price series for capital goods, which in-
37 Deane and Cole argue that agricultural income was equivalent to 43% of national income (1962, p.
78). Crafts (1985, p. 16) considered this ﬁgure to be too high and proposed instead a share of 37%. Of this,
rent is only a fraction. Clark (2002) estimates a proportion of 40%, which suggests a share of land
(abstracting from urban rents) of 15%. This is exactly the ﬁgure proposed by Crafts (1985).
38 Clark (1998, 2002), Turner et al. (1997). Allen (1999, pp. 23–25) argues that each has advantages and
ﬂaws.
39 Allen (1994, p. 111).
40 The situation is analogous to the response of prices to an exogenous increase in money supply in a
macroeconomic model with staggered adjustment of individual prices. In this type of models, money is
neutral in the long run and unless one introduces real rigidities, inﬂation is likely to catch up with money
growth quite fast. See Chapter 6 in Romer (1996) for an introduction to these models. A similar argument
can be made for the impact of enclosure. Some scholars (Allen, 1992) have argued that rent increases did
not signify greater land productivity, but simply showed a redistribution of income. Since such an eﬀect
should, in the medium to long term, be reﬂected in correspondingly slower wage growth, our results would
not be aﬀected.
41 Hall and Jorgenson (1967). Our reasons for not using estimates of the capital/output ratio to
calculate the rental rate are discussed in Antr  a as and Voth (2000). Note that Eq. (5) is not dependent on
assumptions about the production function, but follows from maximizing the value of the ﬁrms assets. Cf.
the Appendix A.
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42 For the deprecia-
tion rates, we calculate the average annual rates from the estimates of capital for-
mation constructed by Feinstein and Pollard.
43
A potentially more delicate question is the choice of interest rate. We would ide-
ally like to use interest rates for private sector borrowing, such as the loan rate
charged by country banks. Such information is presently not available. We use the
yield on Consols instead.
44 Three Percent Consols, the largest component of the Brit-
ish governments funded debt, paid a ﬁxed nominal interest rate of 3% and were per-
petual yet—in principle—callable. Their price ﬂuctuated in response to changes in
the supply and demand of capital, inﬂation, and the perceived riskiness of govern-
ment bonds. There is every reason to assume that private-sector borrowing was more
expensive than that of the government. As long as the spread of private over public
borrowing was relatively constant, however, we will still be able to infer trends over
time from the yield on Consols.
The potentially most damaging problem could arise from the usury laws—English
law imposed an upper limit on interest rates. In times of high government borrowing,
such as during wartime, private investment might have been crowded out. English
wartime borrowing was high. At the time of Waterloo, Britains public debt was val-
ued at 2.3 times GDP. This would make the use of interest rates on Consols prob-
lematic—their yield would not only be lower than private sector borrowing rates,
but the diﬀerential would vary substantially over time. Thus, the interest rate on
Consols used may not just be artiﬁcially low, but may also mask very high rates
of interest for private borrowing during wartime.
45 Subsequent research, however,
strongly suggests that this was not the case.
46 Clark (2001a) shows that charities ob-
tained yields on their assets that were similar to the Consol yields. Also, the rates of
return on mortgages by the Sun Life insurance are broadly similar to Consol yields
and the charity returns.
47 The Sun Fire Insurance, just like other insurance compa-
nies, invested some of its premium income in private debt.
48 Mortgages tended to be
relatively long-dated, often with maturities of 10 years or above. However, since the
interest rate was subject to renegotiation, mortgage rates were not similar to long-
term commercial interest rates. As Table 2 shows, the premium that could be earned
from investing in mortgages was relatively small.
Movements over time in the rate of interest did not diﬀer greatly, even if there is
some divergence in the 1770s and 1780s. The correlation between Consol yields and
the Sun rate of return is 0.64; between the Consols and the charity returns, it is 0.82.
42 Feinstein (1978, p. 38). We weight these according to their contribution to the total stock of
domestic reproducible ﬁxed assets (Feinstein and Pollard, 1988, Table XIV, p. 454).
43 Feinstein and Pollard (1988, Table I, p. 427).
44 Mitchell (1971, p. 455).
45 Williamson (1984).
46 Cf. Mokyr (1987), Clark (2001a).
47 John (1953). The rates are from the Sun Fire Insurance, Minutes of the General Meeting and
Minutes of Quarterly Meetings.
48 Mortgages constituted around 50% of stock account balances (Mirowski, 1981, p. 562).
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assets, oﬀering a lower yield on account of the low perceived default risk. There is
therefore little empirical evidence to suggest that the rate of return on private assets
did not move in line with the yield on Consols.
49
This conclusion is strengthened by the fact Consol rates acted as an important ref-
erence rate for a considerable part of economic activity. Public utility investment
rose and fell in line with the yield on Consols, most notably in the case of turnpike
construction.
50 From 1770 onwards, London interest rates had a strong inﬂuence on
the Yorkshire property market, and nationwide swings in bankruptcies also suggest
a high degree of capital market integration.
51 Consol rates also inﬂuenced the rate of
enclosure.
52
Having discussed the methodological assumptions underlying the dual approach
to productivity measurement as well as the data sources used, we now turn to the
main results. Table 3 gives our preferred estimates of TFP growth during the Indus-
trial Revolution, and compares them to the latest estimates oﬀered by Crafts and
Harley.
53 We follow Crafts (1985) in using factor shares of 0.5 for labour, 0.35 for
capital, and 0.15 for land initially.
When we use the Feinstein price series in our benchmark 1estimate, the rental
cost of capital is falling for the ﬁrst period 1770–1801. Combined with slow growth
in real wages and rents, this implies very slow TFP growth. To avoid the inﬂuence of
volatile year-to-year variations in prices, we use decade averages. The best standard
of comparison is the latest set of estimates from Crafts and Harley, which we adapt
to a three-factor model.
54 The last estimate in Table 3 gives the ﬁgures for such an
approach. The baseline Crafts–Harley estimate becomes 0.19% p.a. for 1760–1801
and 0.5% p.a. for 1801–31. These ﬁgures are marginally higher than the original
Table 2
Interest rates in England, 1750–1799
3% Consols Charity returns Sun ﬁre oﬃce mortgage rate
1750–59 3.40 4.31 4.30
1760–69 3.60 4.53 4.70
1770–79 3.74 4.65 4.10
1780–89 4.65 4.68 4.85
1790–99 4.54 4.82 4.65
Sources. See text.
49 Neal (1994, p. 156) calls the consol rate ‘‘the best barometer of the schedules of loanable funds.’’
50 Presnell (1960).
51 Buchinsky and Polak (1993), Hoppit (1986).
52 McCloskey (1994, p. 254).
53 Note that, since the new Feinstein wage series is only available from the 1770s onwards, we can only
present estimates from this data onwards.
54 Cf. Antr  a as and Voth (2000) for details.
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55 Benchmark
1yields an estimate for the ﬁrst period that is 0.09% lower and an estimate for the
second period that is 0.09% higher.
Overall, our benchmark 1estimates for the ﬁrst 60 years of the Industrial Revo-
lution agree almost exactly with those favoured by Crafts and Harley. Our estimates
of price changes would have to be wrong by several orders of magnitudes to restore
Table 3
Estimates of productivity growth in England, 1770–1860
Annual percentage rate of change rw q TFP
Benchmark Estimate 1
1770–1800 )0.39 0.40 0.27 0.10
1800–1830 0.82 0.34 0.87 0.59
1830–1860 )0.33 0.56 0.36 0.22
1770–1830 0.22 0.37 0.57 0.35
Benchmark Estimate 2 tot
1800–1830 0.82 0.34 0.87 )1.22 0.71
1830–1860 )0.33 0.56 0.36 )1.61 0.44
Preferred Estimate gov
1770–1800 )0.40 0.35 0.26 2.60 0.27
1800–1830 0.71 0.25 0.76 1.11 0.54
1830–1860 )0.210.68 0.48 0.31 0.33
1770–1830 0.15 0.30 0.51 1.85 0.41
YKLT
Crafts and Harley (1992)
1760–1801 1 1 0.8 – 0.1
1801–1831 1.9 1.7 1.4 – 0.35
1760–1831 1.45 1.35 1.1 0.22
Crafts and Harley (1992)—three-factors*
1760–1800 1 1 0.8 0.2 0.19
1801–1831 1.9 1.7 1.4 0.4 0.50
1831–1860 2.5 2.0 1.4 0.6 1.00
1760–1831 1.45 1.35 1.1 0.3 0.34
Sources. See text. Crafts and Harley (1992). * as recalculated by Harley (1999b, p. 183).
Notes. Benchmark estimate 1does not correct for changes in the terms of trade or indirect taxes, and
uses the Feinstein price index. Benchmark estimate 2 uses the Feinstein price index, and adjusts for terms
of trade eﬀects as discussed in the text. Preferred estimate uses the GDP deﬂator by Clark (2001b), and
adds changes in indirect taxes. tot is the change in the terms of trade, based on Imlah (1958). gov is the
growth in indirect taxes, based on Mitchell (1971, pp. 386–393).
55 For the ﬁrst period, 100% of the revision is a result of assigning a greater weight to capital (capital
grows at 1% p.a., land at 0.2% p.a.; increasing the weight on capital from 0.35 to 0.5 reduces the TFP
measure). In the second period, growth would be 0.15% p.a. more rapid if Craftss original three-factor
approach had been pursued (TFP¼0.5% p.a. instead of 0.35%).
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56 For the period 1831–60, we
ﬁnd positive TFP growth, just as Crafts (1985) argued, if at a markedly lower level.
We believe that the Feinstein (1998a) price series is superior to the alternatives.
The use of a GDP deﬂator would, however, be conceptually more appropriate.
The consumption price index contains imported goods, and fails to fully incorporate
all goods exported. Since it is the productivity of the British economy that we are
trying to measure, the GDP deﬂator is the conceptually correct price series. Also,
the weights in the Feinstein index reﬂect the basket of goods purchased by working
class households, not economic output as a whole. Two procedures can address this
problem. We can use either an explicit correction for terms-of-trade eﬀects to over-
come the ﬁrst issue, or we can use existing estimates for the GDP deﬂator, and side-
step both conceptual problems.
Sharp deteriorations of the terms of trade will lead us to underestimate true pro-
ductivity growth, since the decline in the external value of Britains products—and
not the rate of productivity growth alone—is partly responsible for the slow rise
in the combined value of all factors of production. To incorporate changes in terms
of trade, we apply an adjustment to our estimates. In an open-economy, the CPI will
be a weighted geometric average of the price of domestic goods (PN) and the price of
imports (PM), while the GDP deﬂator is a weighted average of the price of non-
traded goods and the price of exports (PX). If the shares of non-tradables in con-














   1 a
¼ C
 ð1 aÞ; ð6Þ
where C are the terms of trade, CPI is the Feinstein index from our benchmark 1
estimate, whereas P is the GDP deﬂator we should ideally use. We thus obtain
^ s s ¼  ð 1   aÞ^ C C where a is the share of exports in national product. To adjust the
productivity calculation for changes in the terms of trade, we have to add a cor-
rection to the original ﬁgure. The accouting equation becomes TFPDual ¼ ^ Y Y   gK ^ K K 
gL^ L L   gT ^ T T ¼ gK^ r r þ gL^ w w þ gT^ q q þ ^ s s. Reasonable ﬁgures for the terms of trade are
available from 1800.
57 Based on these, we ﬁnd that 0.12 and 0.22% p.a. should
be added to the second and third period (benchmark 2 estimate).
58 These do increase
our estimates of TFP growth, but they remain relatively low overall. We should
note that, since trade statistics are for Great Britain, we do not capture the decline in
the terms of trade for intra-British transactions. Since England eﬀectively traded
manufactured goods for food from Ireland, our ﬁgures probably understate the true
eﬀect of the decline in the terms of trade somewhat.
An alternative is the GDP deﬂator presented by Clark (2001b). This should al-
ready incorporate the eﬀects of changes in the terms of trade. Using it suggests a
56 Those by Feinstein (1981). Converting his ﬁgures to our three-factor approach, using the factor
shares of 0.5, 0.35, and 0.15 for labour, capital and land, respectively, as well as the estimates of land in use
from Crafts (1985), suggests TFP growth of 0.3 and 1.45 for 1760–1801 and 1801–1831.
57 Crafts (1985, Table 7.5, p. 147), based on Imlah (1958).
58 We use the weights from Irwin (1991, p. 98).
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period 1770–1830 as a whole, returns to labour, capital and land appear a little lower
than in the ﬁgures for benchmark 1. We should arguably also include indirect taxes.
These increased rapidly over the period—especially in the ﬁnal decades of the 18th
century. This constitutes an additional claim on output (which would have accrued
to another factor of production if it had not been taxed), and should thus enter in
our calculation with the average share of indirect taxes in national income. Since in-
direct taxes grew by 2.6% p.a. over the ﬁrst 30 years, a share in national income of
8% suggests a correction of +0.21%.
59 During the second and third period, the
changes are smaller (+0.09% and 0.02%). The pattern of relatively slow initial pro-
ductivity growth, followed by a mild acceleration after the end of the Napoleonic
wars, remains unchanged. Without the correction for indirect taxes, productivity
growth is 0.28% p.a. over the period 1770–1830, only marginally lower than the
0.35% we ﬁnd when using the Feinstein consumer price index. Including the claims
of the government suggests total factor productivity growth of 0.41%. This ﬁnal ﬁg-
ure represents our preferred estimate. While not identical with the Crafts–Harley re-
sults, these estimates are very similar in overall magnitude. What divergence there is
from their ﬁgures is a result of including the government sector and terms-of-trade
eﬀects. In terms of economic implications, our ﬁndings conﬁrm that productivity
growth was not fast during the ﬁrst 60 years of the Industrial Revolution—even if
we incorporate the sharp decline in the terms of trade and the increasing claims of
the government sector.
Our ﬁndings are also broadly consistent with those of Clark (2001b), who per-
forms a similar calculation, using factor prices. He ﬁnds productivity growth of
0.2% for the ﬁrst 30 years, 1.0% for the years 1800–1830, and 0.22% for 1830–
1860. The magnitudes are similar, even if the acceleration after 1800 is sharper than
in our ﬁgures. Our estimates for the slowdown after 1830 are broadly similar, ques-
tioning the acceleration found by Crafts and Harley—and lending further weight to
the slow growth argument overall. Diﬀerences between Clarks and our results are
mainly driven by his use of an alternative wage series and cost of capital calculations
that do not employ the Hall–Jorgenson formula.
60
Using 1800 as a benchmark date is common in most growth accounting exercises.
It is more problematic in the case of dual productivity estimates, as the very high
prices of the Napoleonic period may have skewed factor incomes. In particular, it
could be argued that our measures of the return on capital and land are biased down-
wards, at a time when their shares of income actually increased. The problem is
already mitigated since we use decade averages, i.e. our ﬁgures for TFP growth
1771–1801 really compare data from 1771–1780 with 1801–1810. The longer the pe-
riod under consideration, the less volatile short-term price movements matter. We
also present the results for 1770–1830 for the preferred estimate and the benchmark
59 We reduced the share of labour by 5, capital by 2, and of land by 1% in the production function. The
weight of 8% comes from Clark (2001b).
60 Clark performs no sensitivity analysis and only uses his own data series in compiling his estimates.
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than the 0.34 calculated by Crafts and Harley, but hardly a signiﬁcant upward
revision.
4. Sensitivity tests
We have already emphasized that the quality of the underlying data and the dif-
ﬁculties in ﬁxing appropriate weights in aggregating the series allow us to construct
no more than controlled conjectures (Feinstein, 1996). How sensitive are our re-
sults? Here, we analyse the impact of using: (i) diﬀerent factor shares (ii) alternative
series for the rental cost of agricultural land, (iii) diﬀerent measures of the cost of
capital, and (iv) another price series.
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Crafts and Harley (1992) only use capital and labour for the TFP calculations,
assigning an elasticity of 0.5 to each. We take the government sector (with an expen-
diture share in GDP of 8%) into account, setting gL ¼ gK ¼ 0:42 and gGov ¼ 0:08.
This generates our alternative estimate 2. A reasonable upper bound on the factor
share assigned to labour is 0.6–0.7.
62 We use a share of 0.64 for labour, 0.19 for cap-
ital and 0.09 for rents to derive alternative estimate 3. Table 4 compares the results
with our preferred estimate (column 1).
Changing the weights only has a marginal impact on our estimates. TFP growth
for 1771–1800 falls to 0.18% if we disregard land as a factor of production. Just as in
the results of Crafts and Harley, excluding land as a factor of production results in
lower productivity growth. TFP growth after 1831 is almost identical with our pre-
ferred estimate. The alternative estimate (3) shows marginally larger divergence, sug-
gesting a TFP growth rate for 1771–1800 that is 0.11% higher. For the second
period, the range of alternative results is never higher than 0.54% p.a. Even the most
optimistic of these estimates is still considerably below the level of 1.3% originally
calculated by Feinstein. The range of possible estimates therefore remains too low to
lend credence to the rates implied by Cuenca Esteban or Berg and Hudson.
In our preferred estimates, we use the nominal rental cost of land, as calculated by
Clark, which we deﬂate by the price series in Clark (2001b). Two main alternatives
suggest themselves, as argued in our data section. The ﬁrst is to use the rental series
provided by Turner et al. (1997, 1998).
63 Table 5, estimate 2 shows the impact. The
upward revision for the ﬁrst period is small indeed, a mere 0.01% p.a.—clearly no
more than any sensible estimate of the likely margin of error. The diﬀerence for
the second period is somewhat larger, adding 0.13% p.a. to the preferred estimate.
This ﬁgure is now relatively high; the average for the period 1770–1830, which is
much less aﬀected by short-term price movements, only changes from 0.41to 0.47.
61 Note that introducing rational expectations does not materially aﬀect our cost of capital
computations (see Appendix A).
62 Nelson (1964) assumes that the likely upper bound is gL ¼ 0:75 for the US in the twentieth century.
This almost certainly includes a large component for human capital (cf. Mankiw et al., 1992).
63 Allen (1999) argues that these estimates are superior.
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rental series by the price of 11 farm commodities.
64 By using the price of agricultural
products instead of a general price index, we would generate a measure of what part
Table 4
Sensitivity tests—alternative factor shares
Estimate 12 3
gK 0.33 0.46 0.19
gL 0.45 0.46 0.64
gT 0.14 — 0.09
gGov 0.08 0.08 0.08
TFP
1770–1800 0.27% 0.18% 0.38%
1800–1830 0.54% 0.53% 0.45%
1830–1860 0.33% 0.24% 0.46%
Table 5
Sensitivity tests—alternative rent, cost of capital, and price indices
Estimate Percentage
rate of change
rw q gov TFP
Preferred estimate 1 1770–1800 )0.40 0.35 0.26 2.60 0.27
1800–1830 0.71 0.25 0.76 1.11 0.54
1830–1860 )0.210.68 0.48 0.31 0.33
1770–1830 0.15 0.30 0.51 1.85 0.41
Turner, Beckett and
Afton rents
2 1770–1800 )0.40 0.35 0.30 2.60 0.28
1800–1830 0.71 0.25 1.68 1.11 0.67
1830–1860 )0.210.68 0.56 0.31 0.34
1770–1830 0.15 0.30 0.99 1.85 0.47
Clark real rents 3 1770–1800 )0.40 0.35 0.11 2.60 0.25
1800–1830 0.71 0.25 1.10 1.11 0.59
1830–1860 )0.210.68 0.37 0.31 0.31
1770–1830 0.15 0.30 0.61 1.85 0.42
Clark charity returns 4 1770–1800 )1.48 0.35 0.26 2.60 )0.09
1800–1830 0.51 0.25 0.76 1.11 0.48
1830–1860 )0.23 0.68 0.48 0.310.32
1770–1830 )0.480.30 0.51 1.8 5 0.20
Lindert–Williamson
price index
5 1780–1800 1.00 0.11 0.41 2.56 0.64
1800–1830 )0.24 0.79 1.33 1.67 0.60
1830–1860 2.32 0.67 0.33 0.44 1.15
1780–1830 0.26 0.52 0.96 2.03 0.61
Wholesale price index 6 1770–1800 )0.35 0.43 0.312.65 0.33
1800–1830 1.44 0.95 1.49 1.83 1.26
1770–1830 0.54 0.69 0.90 2.24 0.80
64 Clark (2002), appendix.
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output prices in this fashion is undoubtedly correct when trying to calculate the pro-
ductivity of agriculture (based on a dual approach), it is probably less sensible for the
economy as a whole. As we are trying to assess productivity change in the aggregate,
we need to derive a general measure of the increase of product accruing to factors of
production in terms of all outputs. Estimate 3 gives the results using Clarks real ren-
tal cost of land series. TFP growth during the ﬁrst period is even slower than in our
preferred estimate. Growth after 1801 is somewhat more rapid. The two main ﬁnd-
ings—very slow growth during the initial decades, combined with a moderate accel-
eration after 1800—are not overturned by using either the Turner, Beckett and Afton
series or the Clark real rent series. For the period 1770–1830 as a whole, we do not
ﬁnd TFP growth approaching even 1% per year.
Our cost of capital series, based on Consol yields, is arguably less robust than
other data sources. We use the yield on Charity assets as a plausibility check. Esti-
mate 4 gives the results based on the return series from Clark (2001a). We use the
average rent charges backed by the assets of a corporation, by land or a house, as
well as the mortgage rates for turnpike tolls and land.
65 The swings in the cost of
capital become more extreme, largely as a result of very low (real) returns during
the ﬁrst decade of the nineteenth century. This initially leads to negative TFP esti-
mates for the period 1770–1800. The recovery from this depressed level drives up
the rate of TFP growth after 1801. While the point estimates diﬀer from those of
our preferred estimate, the broad pattern of initially slow growth, followed by an ac-
celeration after 1800, is also clearly visible. The average for the period 1770–1830 as
a whole is 0.21% lower than in our preferred estimate.
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The Feinstein price series is relatively pessimistic. To derive an upper bound for
our productivity calculations, we also use the Lindert and Williamson price series
(estimate 5).
67 This leads to higher TFP growth, as is to be expected. Compared
to our preferred estimate, the Lindert and Williamson series results in an upward re-
vision of 0.37 for the ﬁrst period (where we have to compare 1770–1800 with 1780–
1800 because of data availability), an increase of 0.06 for the second period, and 0.82
for the third. Of these diﬀerences, the ﬁnal one is clearly an overestimate. All the cor-
rections in the Feinstein series that reduce the price decline between 1830 and 1850
are sensible improvements, and not a matter of opinion—including the use of a wider
set of goods consumed, adding a better rent series, and updating consumption
shares.
68 For the earlier ones, we note that the Lindert–Williamson series does not
in fact consistently lead to the most optimistic estimates—both the Turner, Beckett
65 The data is available at http://www.econ.ucdavis.edu/faculty/gclark/papers/CCRET99.txt
66 We also experimented with stock market returns. These are not very appropriate in methodological
terms since so few ﬁrms were listed, but they yield broadly similar results (Antr  a as and Voth, 2000).
67 Lindert and Williamson (1985). The nominal wage series agree almost completely; the price series
accounts for the diﬀerence between optimism and pessimism.
68 Feinstein (1998a, Table 3, p. 641). Note that Clark calculates a price series for agricultural labourers
that tends to move between the Lindert–Williamson and the Feinstein series. This, however, largely reﬂects
the peculiarities of their consumption bundle.
68 P. Antr  a as, H.-J. Voth / Explorations in Economic History 40 (2003) 52–77and Afton rents and the wholesale price index by Feinstein (see below) produce high-
er estimates for 1800–1830. Overall, for the years 1780–1830, the Lindert–William-
son series only gives an upward revision of 0.20% per year.
One ﬁnal alternative is the use of another price series (estimate 6). Feinstein (1978)
compiled an index of wholesale prices. Using his series, we ﬁnd marginally higher
factor productivity growth for the ﬁrst 30 years, and then a more substantial accel-
eration—a result of wholesale prices surging more in the inﬂationary period up to
1800, and then declining more rapidly than other price indices. For the ﬁrst 60 years
as a whole, the wholesale index suggests TFP growth of 0.80 instead of the 0.41in
our preferred estimate.
Overall, the sensitivity checks do not suggest that our estimates are particularly
fragile.
69 Two crucial elements of the Crafts–Harley view are vindicated. First, inde-
pendent of the indices for capital cost, rental cost, or overall prices used, we ﬁnd that
productivity growth was very slow during the last three decades of the eighteenth
century. If anything, alternative data sources suggest even lower rates of productivity
change, especially for the ﬁrst 30 years. This, it could be argued, is not as implausible
as it might appear at ﬁrst glance. These low TFP ﬁgures are in the same range as
Voths recent estimates, who revised labour input ﬁgures upwards. Thus, even our
most pessimistic estimates are compatible with primal productivity calculations.
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Second, we ﬁnd an acceleration to more rapid but still moderate rates of TFP growth
during the period 1801–1831. Here, all our alternative estimates—with one excep-
tion—suggest rates at or slightly above the 0.5% p.a. argued for by Crafts and Har-
ley.
One further way of examining the robustness of our ﬁndings is to ask how high
factor price increases would have to be in order to restore the fast growth hypoth-
esis. Table 6 oﬀers such a calculation. We believe that it is highly unlikely that a con-
vincing case for revising real wages substantially upwards will be made. Also,
indirect taxes appear to be increasing as fast as can sensibly be argued for the period.
Therefore, higher productivity growth estimates would have to be the result of faster
growth in the rental rate of capital and land. For ease of presentation, we assume
qtþ1=qt ¼ rtþ1=rt. Also, we believe that the lowest possible rates of productivity
growth needed to restore the view that growth was relatively fast are 1% p.a.
1771–1801 and 1.5% p.a. 1801–1831. By historical standards—e.g., the post-war
boom in OECD countries etc.—these would still be very low. To raise annual pro-
ductivity growth suﬃciently, TFP in 1800 relative to 1770 would have to be 35%
higher—whereas the actual increase, according to our calculations, is 8%. For the
second period, we measure a change of 17.7%; growth of 1.5% per annum requires
an overall rise in TFP in 1830 relative to 1800 of 56%.
69 We derived likely margins of error, based on a method recently extended by Feinstein and Thomas
(2000). The error bands are never small. Nonetheless, rapid productivity growth can be ruled out. Cf.
Antr  a as and Voth (2000) for details. A similar conclusion applies when we introduce rational expectations;
cf. Appendix A.
70 Voth (1998, 2001).
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costs would have to be to produce such a revision. The rental cost of land would
have to increase by 49 and 127%, whereas actual change was +8 and 26%; in the case
of capital, returns would have had to rise by 60 and 103% more than they actually
did to restore the fast growth view. The diﬀerences from our preferred estimates are
very large. Also, even the most optimistic estimates derived from alternative data
sources or using altered assumptions are insuﬃcient to yield TFP growth rates on
this order of magnitude. Another calculation shows how improbable the implica-
tions of signiﬁcant TFP growth—as reﬂected in factor prices—are. If one were to ar-
gue that capital income was indeed signiﬁcantly underestimated, and that the true
change in the rental was closer to the values in Table 6, then the capital share in na-
tional income would have had to increase to 2.8 times its 1770 level by 1830—a
change so large that it can easily be ruled out. While the fragility of the data must
be emphasized, it is hard to see how the evidence from dual productivity estimates
could be reconciled with the view that productivity change during Britains industrial
revolution was relatively rapid.
5. Conclusions
Critics of productivity and growth estimates during the industrial revolution often
imply that the Crafts–Harley view, and the quantity-based calculations on which it is
based, is little more than a house of cards. In particular, some scholars have argued
that output and productivity growth during the English industrial revolution must
have been more rapid than the current orthodoxy has claimed.
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This paper shows that independent evidence, using an alternative method, yields
results that are very similar to the Crafts–Harley view. We base our productivity cal-
culations on factor prices, and thereby oﬀer conﬁrmation of the main ﬁndings by
Crafts and Harley from a new and independent source. The quality of our estimates
can only be as high as our sources allow. Yet, as Feinstein reminds us:
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Table 6
Counterfactual factor price ratios
rtþ1=rt wtþ1=wt qtþ1=qt govtþ1=govt TFPtþ1=
TFPt
Preferred 1800s/1770s 0.89 1.11 1.08 2.18 1.08
1830s/1800s 1.24 1.08 1.26 1.39 1.18
Counterfactual 1800s/1770s 1.49 1.11 1.49 2.18 1.35
1830s/1800s 2.27 1.08 2.27 1.39 1.56
Diﬀerence 1800s/1770s 0.60 0.00 0.41 0.00 0.26
1830s/1800s 1.03 0.00 1.01 0.00 0.39
71 Berg and Hudson (1992) and Cuenca Esteban (1994).
72 Feinstein (1996).
70 P. Antr  a as, H.-J. Voth / Explorations in Economic History 40 (2003) 52–77‘‘The case for quantiﬁcation in the face of the multitude of gaps and un-
certainties in the available data is not that it provides deﬁnitive estimates.
It is, rather, that it helps to establish orders of magnitude, and to test how
robust or vulnerable the estimates are to diﬀerent assumptions and judg-
ements the statistician is forced to make in the face of a lack of satisfac-
tory evidence.’’
It is in this spirit that our results need to be interpreted. Productivity growth was
very slow during the last decades of the eighteenth century, and may even have been
zero. This is compatible with the Crafts–Harley view, and reinforces recent ﬁndings
that further downward revisions of primal TFP calculations due to higher labour
input may well be in order.
73 There was no take-oﬀ in the sense of Rostow. What
acceleration there was occurred after 1800, and was mild. The eﬃciency with which
the economy combined factors of production never increased at a rate markedly
faster than 0.5% before 1830, and probably much less than that.
How can the evidence in favour of slow productivity growth be squared with the
data on foreign trade? Since Temin ﬁnds strong evidence that Britain became an ex-
porter of all manufactured goods, he argues that productivity growth must have
been relatively widespread. This would also suggest that aggregate growth rates have
been underestimated. One of the central underlying assumptions in the Ricardian
model of trade as used by Temin is that the relative price of factors of production
does not change, and that wages are a good proxy for the overall cost of manufac-
turing. Our data on the remuneration of factors directly shed light on this question.
We ﬁnd that the rental price of capital fell while wages rose in the ﬁrst period; in the
second, rental growth outpaced wage increases. The data used in the calculation of
our dual productivity estimates therefore also demonstrate why the foreign trade
data in themself—interpreted in Ricardian framework—are not necessarily at vari-
ance with the Crafts–Harley view of the Industrial Revolution. Britain may have
manufactured a wide range of goods because factors of production other than labour
were relatively cheap.
The dual approach also highlights the close connection between productivity
growth on the one hand and the course of living standards on the other. Some schol-
ars appear comfortable with a relatively pessimistic view of changes in living stan-
dards, while at the same time arguing that productivity growth has been
understated (and is an insuﬃcient measure of the speed of change).
74 These are con-
tradictory positions, as dual measurement of productivity growth makes clear. Un-
less the labour share in national income moved very sharply—for which there
appears to be no reliable evidence—real wage growth in the long run has to follow
the trend rate of TFP increases.
75 Our dual estimates of productivity growth during
the Industrial Revolution do not provide deﬁnitive estimates that could supersede
73 Voth (1998, 2001).
74 Cf. Berg and Hudson (1992, pp. 32–37).
75 Feinstein (1988). Note however that recent work has argued that the capital share may well have
moved up (Feinstein, 1998b).
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they add independent support using an altogether diﬀerent method to the Crafts–
Harley view. Even a house of cards can be remarkably stable if numerous indepen-
dent elements support each other.
Appendix A. Expectations formation and factor prices
Expectations can have an impact on our estimates in two ways. First, if agents
anticipate the relative price of capital goods to change, we need to modify the stan-
dard Hall–Jorgenson formula (Collins and Williamson, 2001). Second, ex ante and
ex post rental rates of capital, land rentals and wages might diverge.
The simple Ramsey–Cass–Koopmans model of growth takes the rental rate of
capital to be equal to the real interest rate plus depreciation. The basic underlying
assumption of the model is that output and capital are de facto the same good,
i.e., the proportion of output that is saved every period is transformed one to one
into capital for the following period. This implies that in this model, the price of cap-
ital relative to output is 1by construction.
In reality, however, the existence of adjustment costs and other such imperfec-
tions, cause the relative price of capital to vary over time. Hall and Jorgenson
(1967) derived an expression for the rental rate of capital in such environments. They
start with the nonarbitrage condition that the relative price of a new capital good
(i.e. its price relative to the numeraire output) has to be equal to the discounted value










Diﬀerentiating this formula with respect to the time of acquisition (t) and assuming
static expectations about the price of investment we get the so-called Hall–Jorgenson
formula:
r ¼ vði   p þ dÞ; ðA:3Þ
which states that the real rental rate of capital is equal to the relative price of capital
times the real interest plus depreciation.
Nowifexpectationsarenotstatic,thatisifpeopleexpecttherelativepriceofcapital
to vary through time, then (assuming perfect foresight) diﬀerentiation of (A.1) yields:
r ¼ vði   p þ dÞ _ v v; ðA:4Þ
which can be expressed as
r ¼ vi
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change in the relative price of capital over the period.
Table A.1demonstrates that some of our conclusions would even be strengthened
if we assume rational expectations about the future evolution of the relative price of
capital goods. We use the preferred estimate as a basis of comparison. TFP growth
in the ﬁrst period would be even weaker, and the acceleration after 1800 would be
slightly sharper. For the ﬁnal period, we also ﬁnd somewhat higher rates of produc-
tivity growth.
It is standard practice in contemporary economic studies to use ex post real inter-
est rates, land rentals and wage rates in the calculation of the cost of capital and la-
bour. To what extent can we be certain that ex post and ex ante factor prices did not
diverge at the time of the Industrial Revolution? If accidental shocks to the value of
money determined the distribution of income generated by production, we may im-
part an important bias to our estimates. Since we average for periods of 10 years, the
chances that one-oﬀ changes in inﬂation will have a signiﬁcant impact are small. At
the same time, money wages and interest rates showed substantial nominal inertia at
the time. To continue the sensitivity analyses carried out in the main part of this
paper, we estimate the ex ante rate of inﬂation. We follow the approach of Barro
and Sala-i-Martin, estimating ARMA (1,1) models of inﬂation.
76 Thus, only past in-
ﬂation enters the expectations formation process. Barro and Sala-i-Martin show that
their estimates track inﬂationary expectations as indicated in surveys relatively
well.
77 Similar models have been widely used in historical studies as well—such as
in an analysis of expected inﬂation during the Great Depression in the US.
78 The ob-
vious alternative would have been to extract expectations from Mishkin-style regres-
sions. Implementation of this appraoch requires the assumption that economic
data such as growth rates are made available to economic agents in a timely
fashion—clearly an unrealistic assumption for the eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries.
We derive the following ARMA model, using the Clark GDP deﬂator as a depen-
dent variable:
P ¼ 87:69 þ 0:85ARð1Þ 0:54MAð1Þ;
ð14:7Þð 15:7Þð   6:2Þ
where P is the price level, AR is the lagged dependent variable, MA is the moving
average component, and t-statistics are given in parentheses. Note that are para-
meter estimates are very similar to the ones obtained by Barro and Sala-i-Martin.
The ﬁtted values from the ARMA model can be then used as predictions of the
future price level to calculate ex ante real rates. Table A.2 compares the real interest
rates, land rentals, and wages, as derived from the ARMA model predictions. The ex
76 Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1990, pp. 15–17). We do this for both the Feinstein series and the Clark
GDP deﬂator.
77 Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1990, Fig. 1, p. 16).
78 Cecchetti (1992).
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ﬁrst and second periods, and slower growth than in our ex post calculations there-
after. Similarly, the rental rate of capital falls less in the ﬁrst 30 years, grows faster in
the second period and then declines by the same amount as with ex-post rates be-
tween 1830 and 1860.
79
Does the use of ex ante rates have an impact on the estimates of TFP growth? Just
as in the case of earlier sensitivity analysis, we ﬁnd that the possible use of alternative
time series does not undermine our conclusions. With ex ante interest rates, produc-
tivity growth during the ﬁrst period would be somewhat faster. In the second period,
Table A.3









Preferred 1 1770–1800 )0.40 0.35 0.26 2.60 0.27
1801–1830 0.71 0.25 0.76 1.11 0.54
1831–1860 )0.210.68 0.48 0.31 0.33
Ex ante
rates
2 1770–1800 )0.23 0.60 0.50 2.84 0.49
1801–1830 0.85 0.27 0.78 1.12 0.60
1831–1860 )0.210.60 0.39 0.22 0.27
Table A.1









Preferred 1 1770–1800 )0.40 0.35 0.26 2.60 0.27
1801–1830 0.71 0.25 0.76 1.11 0.54




2 1770–1800 )0.910.35 0.26 2.60 0.1 0
1801–1830 0.88 0.25 0.76 1.11 0.60
1831–1860 0.24 0.68 0.48 0.31 0.48
Table A.2













1770–9 100 95 100 95 100 95
1800–9 89 89 111 114 108 111
1830–9 110 115 120 124 136 140
1860–9 103 108 147 148 157 157
79 Note that the movement of the capital rental is inﬂuenced by the relative price of capital goods as
well as the real interest rate, and should therefore not move in parallel with the alternative estimates of the
wage and land rental series.
74 P. Antr  a as, H.-J. Voth / Explorations in Economic History 40 (2003) 52–77Englands productivity performance remains below any sensible standard for fast
growth, before declining to 0.27% in the last period (see Table A.3).
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